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In 1935 Ohio, along with 26 other states, adopted a retail
sales tax," to offset the dwindling income from property taxes.
The act was so worded as not to conflict with the Interstate
Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. Hence, sales in
interstate commerce were not taxed.
Ohio merchants have objected strenuously to this tax on
the ground that it discriminated in favor of interstate commerce.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States beginning
with the State Freight Tax Cases2 have held that the state can-
not impose a tax which operates as a direct burden on interstate
commerce.
3
In determining the right of a state to tax a sales transaction
the fundamental question to be decided is whether or not there
has been an actual physical movement of the property sold
from without the state.' If so, is such movement an essential
1Oh. G.C. Sec. 5546-I to 5546-23 both inclusive. (115 Ohio Laws
Pt. II, 3o6).
2 15 Wall. 232, 21 L. Ed. 146 (1864).
3 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 196. 5 S. Ct. 826,
29 L. Ed. 158 (1885); Brown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622, 5 S. Ct. 1091,
29 L. Ed. 257 (1885); Walley v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 6 S. Ct. 454,
29 L. Ed. 691 (1886); Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 32o U.S.
4 81, 7 S. Ct. 592, 30 L. Ed. 694 (1887); Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S.
289, 14 S. Ct. 829, 38 L. Ed. 719 (1894); Kelley v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. i,
23 S. Ct. 259, 47 L. Ed. 359 (903); Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro,
26o U.S. 366, 43 S. Ct. 146, 67 L. Ed. 309 (1922); Cooney v. Mountain
States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 294 U.S. 384, 55 S. Ct. 477, 79
L. Ed. 934. In the latter case, Chief Justice Hughes (March 4, 1935) who
delivered the opinion of the court said: "But a state cannot tax interstate
commerce; it cannot lay a tax upon the business constituting such commerce
or the privilege of engaging in it."
4 Public Utilities Commission for State of Kansas v. Landon, 249 U.S.
236, 39 S. Ct. 268, 63 L. Ed. 577 (3919); Blumenstock Bros. Advertising
Agency v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436, 40 S. Ct. 385, 64 L. Ed. 649
(392o); Dahuke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 42 S. Ct.
io6, 66 L. Ed. 239 (3921).
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part of the sale5 as distinguished from being merely incidental
thereto; is the vendor obligated by the express or unavoidably
implied terms of the sale or contract to sell, to make a physical
delivery of the property which forms the subject matter of the
transaction across a state line to the purchaser.6
The following two types of sales transactions are not sub-
ject to the sales tax, as a result of the interstate commerce
exemption:
I. Tangible personal property is ordered for delivery in
Ohio from a point outside the state, the sale being between the
vendor of the goods located outside the state to the purchaser
in Ohio, and the contract of sale by its express or necessarily
implied terms requiring an interstate movement of the tangible
personal property constituting the subject matter of the order.
A long line of cases has held that this is strictly an interstate
transaction and not taxable by the states.!
2. An agent solicits the order from the Ohio resident for
the non-resident vendor. In the usual case the agent will
travel from house to house taking orders by sample8 either
accepting cash for the sale or arranging for a C.O.D. delivery.
The agent then sends the order to his principal outside of the
state who makes delivery directly to the purchaser or to the
agent for delivery.' The courts have held that the interposition
WUiloil Corporation v. Pennsylvania, 294 U.S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358, 79
L. Ed. 838 (February 4, 1935) ; American Steel and Wire Company v. Speed,
192 U.S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365, 48 L. Ed. 538 (1904).
6 Ware & Leland v. Mobile County, Z09 U.s. 405, z8 S. Ct. 526, 5z
L. Ed. 855, 14 Ann. Cas. 1031 (19o8); Moore v. New York Cotton Ex-
change, z70 U.S. 593, 46 S. Ct. 367, 70 L. Ed. 750 (I9z6).
7 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. z 3 (1824); Brown v. Mary-
land, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (827); Henderson v. Mayor of New
York, 92 U.S. 259, 23 L. Ed. 543 (1875); Wabash, St. Louis and Pacific
Railway Company v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 7 S. Ct. 4, 30 L. Ed. 244
(1886); Weeksv. U.S., 245 U.S.618,38 S.Ct. 21 9 , 6zL.Ed. 5 13 (1918);
Wagner v. City of Covington, zSI U.S. 95, 40 S. Ct. 93, 64 L. Ed. 157
(1919).
8 Brennan v. Titusville, supra note 3.
1 Davis v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 236 U.S. 697, 35 8. Ct. 479, 59
L. Ed. 795 (1915); City of Lee's Summit v. Jewel Tea Co., 217 F. 965,
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of the local agent in this transaction has not taken it out of the
channels of interstate commerce."
The next five groups of cases to be discussed are all closely
related to interstate commerce but fall within the sales tax
classification.
i. A vendor manufactures or otherwise acquires tangible
personal property entirely outside of Ohio, shipping the same
into Ohio to its own agents, who then take orders for the same
making deliveries to purchasers from the stocks supplied to
them. In this case the goods have come to rest within the state
before there is any attempt to make a sale. The sale of such
goods is taxable as long as there is no discrimination against
the property because of its origin at a point outside the state.1'
2. A vendor manufactures or otherwise acquires tangible
personal property outside of Ohio, but maintains a place of busi-
ness or has its own agents in the state, maintaining a stock of
goods in Ohio. Some orders are filled wholly or in part from
stock, and other orders wholly or in part by direct shipment
upon order, either to the agent or direct to the purchaser. The
United States Supreme Court in the case of American Steel &
Wire Company v. Speed 2 held this type of transaction taxable.
133 C.C.A. 637 (19x4); but see Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291,
44 S. Ct. 96, 68 L. Ed. 308 (1923); Bethlehem Motors Corporation v.
Flynt, 256 U.S. 421, 41 S. Ct. 571, 65 L. Ed. o29 (192i); American
Steel & Wire Company v. Speed, supra note 5.
10 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District supra note 3; Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U.S. IOO, io S. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128 (189o); Brennan v.
Titusville, Supra n. 3; Caldwell v. North Carolina, 187 U.S. 622, 23 S. Ct.
229, 47 L. Ed. 336 (903); Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U.S. 507, 27
S. Ct. 159, 5I L. Ed. 295 (i9o6); Western Oil Refining Co. v. Lipscomb,
244 U.S. 346, 37 S. Ct. 623, 6I L. Ed. 118I (917); Sonneborn Brothers v.
.Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 43 S. Ct. 643, 67 L. Ed. 1095 (1923).
" Woodruff v. Parkham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. Ed. 382 (1868); Brown
et al v. Huston, supra note 3; American Steel & Wire Company v. Speed, su-
pra note 5; Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, etc., 262 U.S. 5o6, 43 S. Ct. 643,
67 L. Ed. io95 (1923); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U.S. 499, 49 S. Ct.
188, 73 L. Ed. 475 (1929).
'2 American Steel & Wire Company, supra note 5; Wiloil Corporation v.
Pennsylvania, supra note 5; Armour and Company v. Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, 246 U.S. 1, 38 S. Ct. 267, 62 L.Ed. 547 (918).
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This particular classification includes all sales by representatives
of large mail order houses. The point upon which the decision
seems to turn in these cases is that the particular transaction
taxed is not directly or necessarily referable to interstate com-
merce, and the mere election of a vendor to supply the personal
property ordered, by means of an interstate shipment, does not
deprive the state of the right to tax either the property or the
transaction.
3. An Ohio vendor orders specific tangible personal prop-
erty from outside of the state, and after receiving it, resells it
in the original packages. 3 In this type of sale we must dis-
tinguish between imports from foreign countries and articles in
original packages in interstate commerce. In the case of foreign
imports, the immunity attaches to the import itself before sale,
while, in the other, it depends on whether the tax regulates or
burdens interstate commerce."
4. An Ohio vendor takes an order for tangible personal
property to be delivered in Ohio, and then in turn orders goods
from a manufacturer or wholesaler outside of Ohio, specifying
delivery direct to his customer. The Wiloil case" is almost
directly in point. In that case the Supreme Court of the United
States held that the interstate movement was not a necessary
part of the transaction and, hence, the accompanying immunity
from state taxation was not granted.
5. An Ohio vendor sells tangible personal property to a
purchaser in Ohio, but the purchaser requests delivery to him-
self at a point outside the state. Here we have a transaction
completed within the state. The request of the purchaser that
the article be shipped out of the state is incidental to the sale.'"
Many times such requests are made by purchasers after the sale
3 See supra note I I.
14 Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, etc. supra note I i.
l See supra note 5.
Wiloil Corporation v. Pennsylvania, supra note 5; Ware & Leland v.
Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405, 28 S. Ct. 526, 5z L. Ed. 855, 14 Ann. Cas.
10I (1908).
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has been completed with the sole thought of avoiding the sales
tax. This changing of the channel of business just to avoid a
state tax is not permitted.'7 Without any authority whatever
many firms in Ohio have claimed exemption from the tax
because the goods were billed out of the state or an "O.K."
order was necessary from some outside point. The lack of any
movement of property outside of the state eliminates the neces-
sity of discussing this situation.
In summing up the law applicable to these various trans-
actions, we find that some physical interstate movement of
property is necessary to warrant an exemption from the Ohio
Sales Tax. However, mere interstate movement alone is not
sufficient to avoid the possibilities of taxation. The interstate
movement must be a necessary part of the transaction and the
shipping of goods across state lines where obviously not neces-
sary is not grounds for exemption. If there is a bona fide inter-
state movement, the fact that the shipment is to an agent who
breaks up the original package before delivery does not make
the transaction one intrastate in character. Neither does the
fact that the sale is arranged by an agent in Ohio necessarily
make the sale taxable.
Especially obnoxious to the merchants have been the activ-
ities of companies doing an interstate business who have boldly
decided to capitalize upon this advantage given to them-by the
Constitution. Practically all of these companies operate either
through agents or peddlers, while some use the mail order
catalogue system. These organizations have instructed their
agents to point out to prospective customers the fact that they
do not have to pay a sales tax on any goods purchased from
them. These houses have been very careful to see that their
work does not assume any intrastate character. Specific instruc-
tions are placed in their agency contracts to bring them within
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
There were many attempts to restrain this type of inter-
17 See supra note I z.
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state peddling before the sales tax innovations. An attempt
was made by North Carolina in 193 I's to license persons selling
or offering for sale fresh fruits, fish, or vegetables and who did
not maintain a permanent place of business in the state. Further
provisions stated that the section shall not apply to persons
selling the products of the state of North Carolina. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a tax imposed on the right
to obtain a license to sell goods is really a tax on the goods to
be sold and a discrimination against products of another state. "
The fact that the license tax levied applies equally to all
peddlers within the state and does not discriminate against the
goods of other states does not make such taxes valid.2"
The usual answers given to merchants when they complain
about these out of state transactions is that the loss of business
from local buyers should be counter-balanced by the business
gained from without the state when non-residents attempt to
avoid the tax in their own state. This answer is faulty in that
it assumes that all states have a sales tax." Even if such were
the case, as Mr. Perkins points out in his article on "The Sales
Tax and Transactions in Interstate Commerce"22 matters would
not work out as nicely as indicated. Interstate buying tends to
seek the larger sources of supply. It favors the nationally known
distributors and the nationally advertised product. In inter-
state buying and selling the large commercial states would
prosper at the expense of less industrialized areas. The nation-
ally known distributor and the widely advertised commodity
' Sec. 121 and 121 2 of the Revenue Act of North Carolina of 1931.
1~J Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 23 L. Ed. 347 (1875); Machine
Company v. Gage, ioo U.S. 676, 25 L. Ed. 754 (1879); Wallington v.
Michigan, i6 U.S. 4 4 6, 6 S. Ct. 454, 29 L. Ed. 691 (1886); Brennan v.
Titusville, supra note 3.
2 Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, supra note 3; Lyng v. Michigan,
'35 U.S. 161, 1o S. Ct. 7z5, 34 L. Ed. 150 (189o); Brennan v. Titusville,
supra note 3.
1 According to the Annual Report of the Sales Tax Section of the Tax
Commission of Ohio for the year 1935 there were 26 states having a sales tax
February I, 1936.
112 iz North Carolina L. Rev. 99 (1934).
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profit to the detriment of the small local merchant and the
local product.
Thus, the cry has come down the line from the local village
merchant, the automobile dealer, and the capital goods indus-
tries protesting against this discrimination. Their claim is that
the interstate commerce clause was originated to prevent dis-
crimination against goods of foreign states. It is now operating
to discriminate against goods of the local jurisdiction.
The Ohio automobile dealers were among the first to feel
the effect of this discrimination. At their insistence an act was
passed by the Ohio legislature" pertaining to the registration
and filing of bills of sale for the purchase of automobiles. The
county clerk was ordered to refuse to file copies of any bill of
sale unless the necessary amount of Ohio prepaid sales tax
stamps were attached. The constitutionality of this act was
questioned September 30, 1935 with the Court of Appeals of
the Sixth District granting a writ of mandamus to compel the
clerk to register a bill of sale without the attached stamps. No
cases were cited in the opinion; the court merely pointed out
that the vendor in the transaction was not located in Ohio and
hence the Ohio Sales Tax Act expressly exempted the sale from
the imposition of the retail sales tax.24
An act was later passed by the Ohio legislature providing
for the inspection of motor vehicles and the official certification
of the title of motor vehicles purchased or procured from out-
side of Ohio. 25 A twenty-five dollar fee was to be charged for
an inspection by the State Highway Patrol. The obvious intent
of the originators of this act was to penalize in some manner
those persons purchasing their cars out of the state. The consti-
tutionality of this act was never questioned, as the act was
repealed a few weeks after its passage because of the hardship
23 Ohio G.C. Sec. 6294. x16 Ohio Laws 78, 1935, amended 116 Ohio
Laws 245, 1935.
24 Unreported Court of Appeals Case, No. 3973; State, ex rel. Garner v.
Recy Clerk of Courts, Toledo, Ohio (193 5).
25 Amended Senate Bill No. 386, eff. Dec. 17, 1935; Ohio G.C. 6294-ia
to 62 9 4-Id.
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it was bringing on the residents of other states moving into
Ohio.2 ' However, the Supreme Court of the United States has
often held that the cost of inspection in such cases must be
reasonable." No doubt in view of these cases the inspection
disguise would have failed.
In order to combat the "mail order" menace, House Bill
614 was introduced December I I, 1935, providing for a tax
of one dollar per hundred pages of advertising space in each
mail order house catalogue distributed in Ohio or displayed in
a branch store. The funds received from this tax were to go to
the same use as those derived from the Sales Tax. During the
same session a bill was also introduced in the Senate placing a
license tax on all stores engaged in the method of retailing com-
monly known as the mail order or catalogue method. These
bills did not succeed in passing the Ohio legislature.
February 4, 1935, the following joint resolution28 was
offered in the Ohio House of Representatives: *"Be it resolved
by the General Assembly of the state of Ohio: That the Con-
gress of the United States be, and it is hereby memorialized, to
give relief to the State of Ohio and all other states imposing
taxes based upon or measured by sales of tangible personal
property by immediately providing for the regulation of inter-
state commerce through granting consent to taxation by the sev-
eral states of certain interstate sales as provided by the measure
(SZ897) introduced by Senator Harrison during the second ses-
sion of the seventy-third Congress."
Prodding from the tax commissions of the various states
finally resulted in the introduction of a bill by Senator Harrison
of Mississippi to regulate interstate commerce by granting the
consent of Congress to the several states to levy certain taxes
2, Amended Senate Bill 393, eff. Jan. 16, 1936.
2
7 Red "C" Oil Co. v. N. Car., 22z U.S. 380, 32 S. Ct. 152, 56 L. Ed.
240 (*912); Pure Oil Co. v. Minn., 248 U.S. 158, 39 S. C. 35, 63 L. Ed.
x8o (1918); St. Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U.S. 389, 39 S. Ct. 32o, 63 L. Ed.
662 (I919); Phipps v. Clev. Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 449, 43 S. Ct. 418, 67 L.
Ed. 739 ('973).
2 ' H.J.R. 8.
67
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upon property and capital employed, business done, and sales
made in interstate commerce." There has been no action taken
as yet by either the House Committee or the Senate Committee
on these bills. There is no doubt about the purpose of this
proposal. It is to put a stop to this discrimination against the
intrastate movement of goods. Proponents of the bill relied for
the most part upon those cases"0 supporting the Wilson Act"'
and those 2 supporting the Webb-Kenyon Act.3 At the same time
these two acts were passed, prohibition laws of the individual
states were being openly flaunted and the violators were avoid-
ing liability by taking advantage of the interstate commerce
clause. The combined effect of these acts was to divest liquor
of its character as a commodity in interstate commerce and make
29 S. 2897, 73rd Congress-znd session. Senator Harrison reintroduced
a similar bill, S. 944 in the 74 th Congress.
30 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, ix S. Ct. 865, 35 L. Ed. 572 "(I891);
Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U.S. 17, 25 S. Ct. 552, 49 L. Ed. 925
(19o5); Foppiano.v. Speed, 199 U.S. 501, 26 S. Ct. 138, 5o L. Ed. z88
(19o5); Delamater v. South Dakota, 205 U.S. 93, 27 S. Ct. 447, 51 L. Ed.
724 (1907); Phillips v. Mobile, 2o8 U.S. 472, 28 S. Ct. 370, 52 L. Ed.
578 (19o8); De Barry & Co. v. State of Louisiana, 227 U.S. 1o8, 33 S. Ct.
239, 57 L. Ed. 441 (913).
31 27 U.S.C.A. 12, 26 Stat. 313 (189o). "An act to limit the effect
of the regulations of commerce between the several states and with foreign
countries in certain cases."
"That all fermented, distilled or other intoxicating liquors or liquids
transported into any state or territory or remaining therein for use, consump-
tion, sale, or storage therein, shall upon arrival in such state or territory be
subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such state or territory enacted
in the exercise of its police powers, to the same extent and in the same manner
as though such liquids or liquors had been produced in such state or territory,
and shall not be exempt therefrom by reason of being introduced therein in
the original package or otherwise."
32 Clark Distillery Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 242 U.S. 311,
37 S. Ct. i8o, 6i L. Ed. 326 (1917).
3 z7 U.S.C.A. 1?2, 37 Stat. 699 (913). An act divesting intoxicating
liquors of their interstate character in certain cases."
"That the shipment or transportation, in any manner or by any means
whatsoever of any . . . . intoxicating liquor of any kind, from one state
. * into any other state . . . . which said . . . . intoxicating liquor is
intended, by any person interested therein, to be received, possessed, sold, or in
any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of
any law of such state . . . . is hereby prohibited."
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liquor subject to the police laws of the state in the same manner
as liquor produced there. The similarity between these acts
and the proposal under discussion is obvious. In one, in a time
of emergency Congress permitted the states to exercise control
over liquor even though it was in interstate commerce. Here,
in this tax emergency it is proposed that Congress permit the
states to tax articles even though in interstate commerce.
The argument against the constitutionality of the liquor acts
was the same as that now raised against Sentaor Harrison's tax
proposal, namely, that it is an unconstitutional delegation of
the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. In In
re Rahrer" the Supreme Court upheld this liquor legislation
on the ground that Congress by passing these acts was in effect
exercising its control over interstate commerce. The fact that
it is indirect regulation in the hands of the state does not seem
to make any difference.
It has been contended that the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon
acts could not be used as a basis for future similar legislation
by Congress because of the peculiar nature of alcoholic bever-
ages. However, March 2, 193 6, the Supreme Court in the case
of Whitfield v. Ohio" upheld legislation by the state of Ohio
under the Hawes-Cooper Act. 8 This act was very similar in its
nature to the acts we have had under discussion. It provides
that prison-made goods, after shipment in interstate commerce
into a state, shall be subject to the laws of such state to the same
extent as though manufactured therein and shall not be exempt
therefrom "by reason of being introduced in the original pack-
age or otherwise." Mr. Justice Sutherland in this recent opin-
ion states: "Each statute simply permits the jurisdiction of the
state to attach immediately upon delivery, whether the importa-
tion remain in the original package or not. In other words, the
importation is relieved from the operation of any rule which
recognizes a right of sale in the unbroken package without state
34 See supra note 30.
35 3 U.S.L.W. 27 (1936).
so 49 U.S.C.A. Sec. 65, 45 Stat. 1084, 1929.
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interference-a right the exercise of which never has been
regarded as a fundamental part of the interstate transaction,
but only as an incident resulting therefrom." The court also
relies to a great extent upon In re Rahrer7 indicating that our
present court intends to follow the reasoning supporting these
acts. The fact that the property was to be used in the state
levying the tax would appear to give the state jurisdictional
power to tax it.3'
Assuming that the act is constitutional, those opposed to
this proposed bill attack it on still another ground."0 They
contend that it will cause a reversion to the old interstate tariff
walls of pre-constitution days. For instance, coal might be ex-
tensively produced in state A and petroleum in state B. It is
claimed that under this bill state A could put a very high sales
tax on petroleum and state B could retaliate with an equally
high tax on coal.
History does tell us that the primary reason for the in-
corporation of the interstate commerce clause in the constitution
was to eliminate the trade barriers caused by local state tariffs.
The express terms of Senator Harrison's Act would seem to
negative the possibility of any discrimination arising. "No state
or territory shall discriminate . . . . against the sale of pro-
ducts of any other state or territory nor levy any greater taxes
or excises thereon than on the same, similar, or generally com-
peting tangible personal property in its intrastate commerce."
Discouraged by the failure of Congress to enact Senator
Harrison's bill, the state of California adopted an experimental
tax known as a Use Tax. Ohio was quick to follow the lead of
37 See supra note 30.
38 Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 41 S. Ct. 6o6, 65 L.
Ed. 1139 (i9zi); Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U.S. 449, 49 S. Ct. I88,
73 L. Ed. 475 (1929); Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249,
53 S. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730 (1933); Edelkmaz v. Boeing Air Transport,
Inc., 289 U.S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 591, 77 L. Ed. 1155 (933).
" Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 8303 House of Representatives. 73rd Congress,
second session. It is interesting to note that the opponents of this bill are all
large supply firms engaged in direct selling.
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California and enacted a similar tax. Ohio's new Use Tax went
into effect January I, 1936." This tax applies to all property
purchased for storage, use, or consumption within the state of
Ohio not subject to the Ohio Sales Tax. Such property is taxed
in exactly the same manner and with the same exemptions as
is property sold under the Sales Tax Law."' The practical effect
of this law is to tax only those goods purchased outside of the
state of Ohio and shipped in through the veins of interstate
commerce. This raises our first question as to whether or not
this is a discriminatory tax upon interstate commerce.
It has been decided that the storage, use or other consump-
tion of tangible personal property within the borders of a state
is a proper subject of an excise tax, even though the property
be of out-of-state origin. 2 The courts recognize an exception
in the case of a tax directly on the use of an article in interstate
commerce, as gasoline in the tank of an interstate bus.43 How-
ever, a privilege tax may be levied on the storage of property
to be used eventually44 in interstate commerce. Even though
property is no longer engaged in interstate commerce, it cannot
be taxed discriminatorily because of its origin in another state.4"
The Ohio Use Tax does discriminate between property en-
gaged in interstate traffic as against that in intrastate movement.
However, the combined effect of the Ohio Sales Tax Act and
the Ohio Use Tax, is to levy a similar tax upon all goods
whether in inter- or intra-state channels. This is the approach
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg Dyeing
4" Oh. G.C. Sec. 5546-25-47 both inclusive.
41 For discussion see Carlton S. Dargusch and Darold I. Greek "The Ohio
Use Tax," z Ohio St. L. J. I1 5 (1936); and "The California Use Tax,"
by Roger J. Traynor, 24 Cal. L. Rev. i75 (1936).
42 See supra note 38.
"Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 79 S. Ct. 279, 73 L. Ed. 683
(1929); Eastern Air Transport v. South Carolina Tax Comm., z85 U.S. 147,
5 S. Ct. 340, 76 L. Ed. 673 (1932).
4 Nashville Chattanooga etc. Ry. v. Wallace supra 38; Boeing Air Trans-
port, Inc., supra note 38.
4' Hart Refineries v. Harmon, supra note i i.
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Co v. Query48 and followed in Vancouver Oil Co. v. Henne-
ford.4 7
It is doubtful whether any significance can be attached to
the fact that all cases sustaining this type of legislation have
concerned gasoline taxes. The broad language of the Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query Case indicates that the same principles
would apply to any other commodity.
The assumption that the Use Tax Act is constitutional does
not answer all the problems that arise as a result of its origin.
There is the practical problem of how the millions of users in
a state can be forced to pay such a tax to the state. Ohio has
attempted to solve this problem by requiring retailers of tang-
ible personal property to collect the tax as agents of the state.
The act requires that those vendors who have agents or places
of business within the state of Ohio must register with the tax
commission and collect the tax on all sales to the consumer,
even though the shipment may originate in another state. This
type of compulsory registration was upheld by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Monamotor Oil Com-
pany v. Johnson.48
The Tax Commission of Ohio is urging all retailers not
having a place of business in Ohio to file with the tax commis-
sion and obtain a license to collect the use tax at the time of
each sale for the state of Ohio.
To avoid the cry of discrimination and to abolish the neces-
sity of enforcing two tax acts, a general use tax upon the use
of all property within the state could be levied." There would
be no practical difference in the enforcement of this tax and the
two we now have. The retail merchant would merely collect
the use tax instead of the present sales tax. The same enforce-
ment problem would exist as to those users purchasing prop-
46 z86 U.S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. Ed. 1232. (1932).
47 j83 Wash. 467, 49 Pac. (2d) 14 (i935).48 292 U.S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. Ed. '14I (1934).
49 See supra note 38.
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erty from parties not subject to the regulation of the state tax
commission.
Temporarily, at least the legislators with the aid of the use
tax have silenced the complaints of the merchants and provided
additional income for the state. The constitutionality of the
Use Tax must still be determined by the Supreme Court.
